$afety first by Charles Gerena
C
oal mining is the heart of
Logan County, W.Va. When
the industry prospers, Logan
prospers. And when something bad
happens, everyone prays for a miracle. 
On Thursday, Jan. 19, two crews of
miners were working in separate 
sections of Alma Mine No. 1, not far
from the town of Logan. Around 
5:30 p.m., an atmospheric monitoring
system detected high levels of 
carbon monoxide about two miles
from the mine’s entrance. The source
of the toxic fumes was a fire on one of
the conveyor belts that carries coal out
of the mine. 
According to initial reports, a dis-
patcher told everyone inside to get
out. Among the 12 men closest to the
fire, 10 managed to evacuate. Thick
smoke had replaced the fresh air they
were breathing, obscuring their view
and choking their lungs before they
slipped on their portable oxygen
packs. The miners locked hands and
made their way through miles of pas-
sageways carved into the earth until
they met up with the other crew and
rode a diesel-powered railcar to the
mine’s entrance.
Amid the smoke and intense heat,
two men were somehow separated
from their crew. Family, friends, and
co-workers gathered at a nearby
church on Friday to await news of 
the lost souls, recalling the heart-
wrenching scenes less than three
weeks earlier in Tallmansville near the
Sago mine explosion. It wasn’t until
Saturday when rescuers finally tamed
the fire enough to expand their search
and found two lifeless bodies.
Friction generated from a stuck or
misaligned conveyor belt could have
sparked the deadly fire. Or, an electri-
cal problem in the motor that drives
the belt could have occurred.
Speculation on the fire’s cause will
continue until the federal Mine Safety
and Health Administration (MSHA)
and the West Virginia Office of
Miners’ Health, Safety and Training
complete their investigations. In the
meantime, federal prosecutors are also
investigating the accident for possible
criminal violations. 
Coal mine workers in West
Virginia, Virginia, and other parts of
the country face an unpredictable,
challenging workplace. “By its very
nature, a mine is so dynamic. It never
sits still,” says Patrick Graham, direc-
tor of safety and human resources 
for Bluestone Coal Corporation 
in Beckley, W.Va. Every time someone
tunnels into a mountain or blasts
through layers of dirt and rock 
to reach a coal seam, miners’ work 













































When markets work, it pays for 
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including the coalfields of Virginia 
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nothing changed, “there would be no
production.” 
Graham believes coal mine opera-
tors control the conditions as best as
they can and minimize risks through
careful planning. But with West
Virginia losing 19 mine workers in
seven accidents between January and
May, it might seem logical to side with
union leaders, some lawmakers, and
other safety advocates who say compa-
nies put profits before people and
ought to invest more in safety.
Aracoma Coal, owner of the Alma
mine and a subsidiary of Richmond,
Va.-based Massey Energy, has been
cited for numerous violations related
to its fire suppression systems and 
procedures to control the amount 
of coal dust and other combustible
materials in the mine. 
Despite these concerns, the
American workplace, including mines,
has become safer over the last 100
years. Textile workers no longer toil
behind locked doors in poorly venti-
lated workshops, while coal miners use
roof bolts instead of hastily placed
timbers to prop up underground 
tunnels. The rate of work-related fatal-
ities continues to improve, going from
5.2 deaths per 100,000 full-time work-
ers in 1992 to 4.1 deaths in 2004. The
rate of nonfatal injuries and illnesses
also declined over the same period,
dropping from 8.9 incidents per 100
full-time workers to 4.8 incidents.
Safety advocates credit tougher reg-
ulation on the state and federal level,
especially since the creation of the U.S.
Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) in 1970. Also,
companies are more aware of hazards
and the human toll of accidents.
Executives point to technological
advances that have made workplaces
both safer and more productive.
Firms are profit-maximizing enti-
ties. Managers usually base their
decisions on whether they benefit the
bottom line. What some economists
are quick to point out is that these very
same financial incentives can have a
positive influence on workplace safety. 
An unsafe workplace is costly.
Accidents result in direct costs, from
the replacement of capital equipment
to higher workers’ compensation 
premiums. They also have indirect
costs such as decreased productivity
and higher wages paid to employees. 
Of course, people still get hurt or
killed more often than we would 
prefer, and certain occupations like
coal mining, commercial fishing, and
truck driving have their inherent 
dangers. Overall, government policies,
in combination with private-sector
initiatives, have improved workplace
safety by raising the financial toll of
poor safety practices and supporting
the development of better practices.
Boom Times and Red Hats
Safety was a significant problem in the
early days of the nation’s industrializa-
tion. Over time, the economy has
shifted from producing goods to 
producing services and substituted
labor with capital. The result has been
fewer workers put at risk in relatively
dangerous occupations like manufac-
turing and fewer dangers associated
with manual labor. 
For example, coal mine workers use
remote controls to operate massive
continuous mining machines that cut
into coal beds deep underground.
“[The mine worker] is standing back at
a considerable distance from where
the machine is operating,” describes
Chris Hamilton, senior vice president
of the West Virginia Coal Association,
a trade association representing mine
operators. “He is standing within a
safety zone, as opposed to being on the
machine … and being subjected to roof
falls, coal bed gases, or other environ-
mental problems.”
While economic progress has
helped improve workplace safety, that
progress hasn’t been uninterrupted.
Workplace safety deteriorated during
the 1960s, according to Mark Aldrich,
former senior economist at OSHAand
a professor emeritus at Smith College.
Unions clamored for the federal 
government to do something, which it
did by creating OSHA, but Aldrich
believes the real culprit was the busi-
ness cycle. “It wasn’t that American
industry was getting worse. There was
a long boom beginning in the
Kennedy-Johnson years, and you could
see the injury rates pick up in manu-
facturing.”
As companies ramped up produc-
tion, many new employees entered the
work force. “When the economy is
booming, labor turnover goes up,”
Aldrich explains. So, even the best
safety program becomes overwhelmed
by a flood of inexperienced new hires,
diluting the effectiveness of training. 
Yet fatalities and accidents in the
coal mining industry fell to an all-time
low in 2005 despite recent growth in
demand. Production levels have been
fairly steady and payrolls have picked
up in the last few years, but neither has
accelerated at a pace that would
endanger safety, in Aldrich’s view. 
What if the price of coal remains
high and mine operators keep facing
pressure to staff reopened sites?  “That
is a recipe for trouble,” Aldrich says.
“The companies are going to hire peo-
ple who don’t have much experience.
Unless they have really good safety
procedures,” the level of workplace
safety could decline.
Experienced workers are already
harder to find. Judy Steele Horne, a
certified mine safety instructor based
in Cedar Bluff, Va., says a lot of 
seasoned miners couldn’t handle the
instability in the industry and retired
or moved. This has left fewer veterans
to call upon, forcing mine operators
to hire a lot of people who aren’t
accustomed to working together or at
a mine. 
These inexperienced workers, also
known as “red hats,” must face the
rigors of the job and pressure from
companies eager to boost produc-
tion. “They have to be fast learners,”
Horne adds. 
The miners who died in the Alma
fire weren’t red hats, however. Don
Bragg had spent almost half of his
adult life in coal mining — nine and a
half years — while Ellery Hatfield was
a miner for 11 and a half years. Other
recent mining accidents have involved
experienced workers. Horne says that
when miners move to a new site, it is a
time of transition. Plus, there is peer
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put themselves in situations that com-
promise safety.
Accidents Have a Price
Beyond shifts in the overall economy, 
a more significant influence on 
workplace safety is the expense of
occupational injuries and fatalities to
individual firms. Companies will invest
more in equipment upgrades, better
training, and other safety improve-
ments as long as these investments are
less than the cost of work-related acci-
dents that are avoided.
For example, accidents result in lost
output. Production comes to a halt,
equipment has to be repaired or
replaced, and new workers have to be
hired and trained. The closure of the
Alma mine reportedly cost Massey
Energy $18.5 million in labor and lost
sales during the first quarter of 2006.
(Some areas of the mine are now open
except for the section damaged by 
the fire.)
“Safety improves the regularity of
the production process,” notes Peter
Dorman, an economist at Evergreen
State College who authored a 1996
book on occupational safety.
Along these lines, reducing the
number of accidents may also increase
a company’s productivity. However,
some safety measures can slow down
the pace of production, such as the use
of manually operated machine guards
on power saws and other equipment.
Therefore, the net effect of safety
investments on productivity varies
from company to company.
Patrick Graham says safety
improvements like coal dust controls
and automatic temporary roof 
supports, which protect workers as
they install bolts to support the ceiling
of a mine tunnel, have benefited
Bluestone Coal. “You can’t have a pro-
ductive, profitable mine if something is
unsafe,” he insists. “Either you move
that mountain safely or you’ve lost a
$1.5 million bulldozer.”
Premiums for workers’ compensa-
tion insurance are another cost
associated with work-related accidents.
Before states began introducing work-
ers’ compensation in the 1910s, injured
workers could sue for damages. But
they had to prove that the employer’s
negligence was solely to blame, which
was difficult to do. Workers rarely won
their lawsuits and, when they did 
succeed, only a few settlements were
large enough to cover lost wages and
medical expenses. 
Now, companies must pay a fixed
percentage of an employee’s wage for
injuries or deaths in the workplace,
regardless of who is at fault. In addition,
they have to purchase insurance or self-
insure in order to cover future claims.
The premium is usually the payroll mul-
tiplied by a base rate calculated for the
firm’s industry and an “experience mod-
ification factor” based on the company’s
claim history. As a result, an unsafe work
environment should affect a company’s
bottom line, thus providing an incentive
to make conditions safer.
Hazard Pay
Perhaps the most noteworthy financial
impact of accidents is the higher salary
that relatively riskier companies may
have to offer. Economists like W. Kip
Viscusi at Harvard University believe
that the desire to avoid these addition-
al labor costs is a strong incentive for
firms to invest more in workplace safe-
ty, while others question how often this
happens in real life. 
The idea is that less desirable jobs,
including those with relatively high acci-
dent rates, pay better wages in order to
attract and retain workers. But there are
always risk-averse people who would
never set foot in an underground mine
regardless of the salary — they want
lower-paying, safer work. Therefore,
firms that are relatively more dangerous
theoretically have a choice. They can
spend more on safety, saving the money
they would have spent trying to entice
workers. Or they can continue paying a
risk premium, also known as a compen-
sating wage differential.
“They are two sides to the same
coin,” notes Devra Golbe, an eco-
nomist at Hunter College who
specializes in finance and industrial
organization. For each company,
“there is a balance that is struck”
between the wages and safety that it
offers in order to generate a given level
of profit. 
In theory, labor markets should
match up companies that are offering
different combinations of wages and
safety with workers looking for similar
conditions. Those who care more
about maximizing their income should
end up in relatively riskier, higher-pay-
ing occupations, while those who want
to maximize their comfort and safety
should get what they want. 
Research by Viscusi and others
shows that risk premiums do account
for differences between safe and
unsafe industries. For instance, the
average salary of a mining machine
operator was $20.31 an hour in 2004
compared with a shoe salesman’s salary
of $8.80 an hour, partly reflecting the
fact that the mining industry has a
higher number of occupational fatali-
ties per capita than the retail sector.
The question is how well risk pre-
miums reflect varying levels of safety
at companies within an industry, notes
Price Fishback, a University of
Arizona economist who has studied
workplace safety in coal mining and
other industries. “Can workers identi-
fy which are the safe and unsafe mines,
and do they see a premium for being in
an unsafe mine? There is still some
premium [paid by companies within
industries], but it’s harder to detect.” 
The theory underlying risk 
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Getting Safer
The annual fatality rate for American workers
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assumes that employees are fully aware
of workplace risks, can adequately 
factor those risks into their decision-
making, and have job mobility. 
In fact, information asymmetries
exist in labor markets. For example,
OSHA regulations require chemical
producers to disseminate safety infor-
mation to employers that use their
products in the workplace. In addi-
tion, companies must train their
employees on how to access and apply
this information. According to a 2002
article by researchers at Harvard
University’s Transparency Policy
Project, these rules have helped ill
workers figure out what chemicals
may have harmed them and secure
proper treatment and compensation.
But the descriptions for chemical
products are complex and hard to
understand and apply, limiting their
usefulness in accident prevention.
In addition to the challenges of
obtaining information on risks, people
don’t always evaluate that information
accurately. “Depending upon the way a
risk is perceived, you can respond in all
kinds of ways. People don’t process
information like computers,” notes
Mark Aldrich at Smith College. So,
while workers might be properly com-
pensated for their perceived risks, how
well those perceptions meet reality is
an open question.
Even when people accurately
gauge the risks of the work they per-
form, they have to be able to act upon
that information. This isn’t always
easy to do, especially during times 
of rising unemployment or for indi-
viduals with limited alternatives in 
the job market.
“You make the best choices you
can, based on the opportunities you
have,” economist Devra Golbe notes.
“It may be that the alternatives are
poor and people have only relatively
risky, low-paying jobs to choose from
based on their education, where they
live, or other constraints.”
There is evidence that competition
for labor and job mobility was suffi-
cient at the turn of the 20th century
for coal miners and other workers to
switch jobs when work conditions
proved too hazardous, according to
Fishback’s research. But rather than
improve safety, companies initially
paid some risk premium to their
employees instead. By the 1920s, high
turnover in certain sectors like coal
mining prompted companies to begin
improving work conditions. 
All in a Day’s Work
Today, coal mining is a lot safer than it
used to be. But it’s still a risky enter-
prise that commands a wage premium,
making it attractive for small-town
residents in southwest Virginia and
West Virginia. Generations of miners
have developed a thick skin when it
comes to risks, so they likely accept
higher wages over greater safety. 
This attitude was evident among
the students at a recent safety certifi-
cation class taught by Lindell Goode, a
part-time instructor at Triangle Safety
Services in Pineville, W.Va. Workers
must take the course and pass a test
before setting foot in a mine, plus they
have to take an eight-hour refresher
class annually.
On day four of the five-day class,
Goode reviews proper blasting proce-
dures for surface miners. As he
describes how to mix ammonium
nitrate pellets with diesel fuel to make
an explosive, several students asked 
if they could do the same thing with
fertilizer from Wal-Mart.
“We need to have a demonstration
right here,” jokes one student, who 
has been chewing the fat with his
classmates at the rear of the blue 
cinderblock classroom. Goode jokes
right back that everyone is welcome to
experiment in their basement or 
backyard. “No, I want to blow up a
mountain,” the guy replies.
Later, when Goode covers what can
happen to a miner’s lungs without
proper protection, the guys in the
back start muttering to one another.
Goode admits that he didn’t like to
wear a respirator either, but he also
didn’t want to be one of those retired
miners who can barely catch their
breath when they walk. “You can
either do it now, or pay for it later.”
With the training that miners
receive today, not to mention the
media blitz that usually follows an
accident, it would be hard for a red hat
to plead ignorance about the dangers
that lie head. It wasn’t always that way.
Most of what Don Cook knew about
coal mining came from his father and
grandfather, both of whom were min-
ers. He didn’t have the information
that new miners receive today in
courses like the ones he teaches at
Triangle Safety. 
When Cook started mining in the
1970s, the only thing new employees
had to do was visit the safety director’s
office. “The guy gave you a little book
and a brass tag for your belt that had
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The Price of Danger
The premiums charged by BrickStreet Mutual Insurance, a private firm that took over 
West Virginia’s workers’ compensation program in 2006, generally reflect industry 
differences in workplace safety.
Workers’ Comp  Nonfatal Injury/Illness 
Premium, 2005* Rate, 2004**
Timbering $52.20 14.8
Underground Coal Mining $39.86 9.3
Surface Coal Mining $12.98 3.2
Street and Road Construction $10.89 4.6
Chemical Manufacturing $2.80 2.1
*    Per $100 in payroll
**  Number of occupational injuries and illnesses per 100 full-time workers. It is the most recent data available
and was selected to closely match categories used by BrickStreet Mutual Insurance.
SOURCES:BrickStreet Mutual Insurance; West Virginia Bureau of Employment Programs
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Number,” he recalls. “He’d say, ‘Put
that on your belt so if you get killed,
we’ll be able to identify the body.’
[Then] he’d talk to you for about 30
minutes and … you’d go to work.”
Rules of the Road
Safety training is just one component of
the regulatory structure that state and
federal legislators have created to pro-
tect workers. A combination of 
rigorous standards and strict enforce-
ment are supposed to provide an
incentive for improving safety. In order
to avoid the wrath of agencies like
OSHA, companies are expected to
invest more in protecting their workers. 
Many economists contend that
while OSHAinspections and interven-
tions can jolt specific companies into
addressing safety problems, their abili-
ty to influence these firms diminishes
over time and their effect on the aggre-
gate level of workplace injuries and
illnesses across all industries is limited. 
One reason is the low probability of
being caught red-handed. Despite
efforts to increase the pace of inspec-
tions, it would take 117 years for
OSHAto check each workplace under
its jurisdiction at least once, according
to the AFL-CIO. The probability of 
a follow-up visit to check on a 
company’s compliance is also low.
Another reason is that many safety
regulations merely codify what are
already common practices that
address obvious hazards, notes the
University of Arizona’s Price Fishback.
“Where regulations are really helpful
is in identifying issues and preventing
things that are really hard to detect or
might not show up for several years.” 
A separate federal entity handles
workplace safety in the coal mining
industry: the Mine Safety and Health
Administration. MSHA is a product of
legislation passed in 1977, five years after
a fire killed 91 workers at a silver mine in
Idaho. Increased government regulation
of mining followed other major mining
accidents in 1940 and 1968.
Most mine penalties are based on
six criteria outlined in the 1977 Mine
Act, including the size of the mine, its
financial condition, and its history of
violations and remediating those
problems. Still, “most fines are so
small that they are seen not as deter-
rents, but as the cost of doing
business,” argued Wes Addington, a
lawyer with the Appalachian Citizens
Law Center, in a New York Times article
(March 2, 2006). 
Since the Sago incident in January,
there has been a concerted effort to
improve mining safety. Federal law-
makers have made several proposals
and West Virginia passed several new
regulations in a special session. But
some question how effective those
proposals would be in bettering work-
ing conditions.
Some businesspeople believe that
the best way to make workplaces safer
is to target proven “bad apples” for
government scrutiny instead of
inspecting everyone the same way.
Since 1997, OSHA has operated an
inspection program that targets com-
panies which have reported 12 or more
injuries or illnesses resulting in days
away from work, restricted work activ-
ity, or job transfer for every 100
full-time workers. 
Research by Golbe and economist
Randall Filer suggests that firms with
the thinnest operating margins and 
in danger of bankruptcy have more
dangerous workplaces. This implies
that safety regulators should focus on
the companies closest to the financial
edge. Currently, financially troubled
mines can have a fine reduced if they
can prove that it would be a hardship. 
Industry officials have also asked
for tax incentives or grants to help pay
for improvements beyond current
safety standards. But economists cau-
tion against subsidies that would not
yield benefits to safety in excess of
their cost to taxpayers or would add
another layer to an already complex
tax system.
Others have also called for greater
federal spending on basic research and
development. Generally, incremental
advancements over time can enable
companies to improve safety at a lower
direct cost without hurting productiv-
ity. “Very often, safety comes into
workplaces with new factories and
equipment,” Mark Aldrich notes.
Time appears to be the best ally of
occupational safety. As the human and
financial toll rises, politicians rally to
protect workers while companies realize
the bottom-line value of improving safe-
ty and pursue new technologies.  RF
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